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AStudy of Liquidity Premiums on
Federal and Municipal Government
Securities Phillip Cagan
A rate premium on long- relative to short-term securities of com-
parable quality may be due to transaction costs, expectations of a rise
in rates, or the greater "liquidity" of short-term securities. Recent
studies have helped to clarify the nature and magnitude of these in-
fluences. An important study by Kessel1 shows that U.S. long-term
bond yields typically exceed bill rates by more than the difference in
transaction costs plus any differential attributable to expectations. The
premium apparently reflects the greater liquidity of short securities,
that is, their greater marketability at relatively stable prices, a charac-
teristic of financial instruments which declines as term to maturity in-
creases. Liquidity provides a nonpeduniary return that substitutes in
part for interest payments and accounts for the higher interest rate on
longer-term securities. The premium on the higher yielding security
measures the marginal advantage of holding the more liquid security.
NOTE: Conversations with Stanley Diller on earlier drafts of this paper have helped
greatly to clarify the argument. I also received useful comments from Jack Guttentag
and Geoffrey H. Moore of the National Bureau and from Herschel Grossman, Reuben
Kessel, and Burton G. Malkiel.
I wish to thank also Josephine Trubek, who collected the data and supervised the
initial, exploratory computations, and Jae Won Lee, who helped in the final stages of
the research.
1ReubenKessel, TheCyclical Behavior of the Term Structure of InterestRates,
NBER Occasional Paper 91, New York, 1965.108 Essays on interest Rates
Such a premium is analytically distinct from yield differentials due to
expectations of changes in rates and to risk of borrower default. This
study examines the changes in liquidity premiums over long and short
periods and tests two theories of their behavior. To abstract from de-
fault risk, the data pertain to U.S. securities and municipal bonds of
uniform quality. Allowing for expectations is more difficult, and the
analysis explores various ways of removing their effects.
Average Liquidity Premiums Over Business Cycles
A curve showing yields by term to maturity incorporates the cyclical
influence of expectations. Investors will ordinarily expect short-term
rates to rise during business expansions and to fall during business con-
tractions.2 An expected rise in rates would make long rates higher
than short rates in anticipation of greater capital losses on the longer
maturities, thus contributing to an upward sloping yield curve, and con-
versely for an expected fall in rates. These varying expectations over
a cycle will tend to cancel out in an average curve for each full cycle.
Given that expansions are usually much longer than contractions, it is
not clear that an unweighted average of monthly data is best. It may be
better to give each stage rather than each month of the business cycle
an equal weight, in order to approximate a yield curve for which ex-
pectations forecast no cyclical change in rates. If investors expect the
cyclical movement of rates to proceed more rapidly in business con-
tractions than it does in expansions, such stage averages overweight
contraction periods, when rates are generally expected to fall, and so
make the estimated slope of the yield curve, if anything, too flat. An
unweighted monthly average, in contrast, probably makes the slope too
steep. Neither the weighted nor the unweighted cycle average, how-
ever, eliminate any expected secular trend in rates; the upward trend
in rates during the 1950's, if expected, could have added an upward.
tilt to the curve throughout that decade. Trend is discussed subse-
quently.
Chart 4-1 presents yield curves which, to eliminate most of the
cyclical effects of expectations, are averages of National Bureau
reference stages. There are nine stages in reference cycles. The initial
2Seemy studyof "Changesin the Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates," Review of
Economics and Statistics, August 1966, reprinted as NBER Occasional Paper 100.
There have been changes in the timing and amplitude of interest rates, but their con-
formity to reference cycles has always been high.Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 109
and terminal trough stages are averages of data for the three months
surrounding the two trough months, and the peak stage for the three
months surrounding the peak month. The period of expansion is di-
vided equally into three stages, as is the contraction period. These nine
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stage averages are then averaged with equal weight except for the
initial and terminal trough stages, each of which receives one-haff
weight. The curves in the chart are for U.S. and municipal securities in
the 1954—58 and 1958—6 1 cycles. The municipal series is composed of
new issue yields in two quality groups.3 Most of the series underlying
the chart begin after World War II and do not allow comparisons with
earlier decades.
The curves exhibit a strong upward slope, somewhat greater for the
later cycle than for the earlier one. For U.S. securities, the upward
slope tapers off rapidly in the maturity segment of one week to about
two or three years. The slope for municipals starts out smaller, judging
by the one- to two-year maturities, but declines more gradually. The
slope is somewhat greater for good than for prime municipals.4 The
stage averages, as noted, probably even understate the degree of up-
ward slope. The characteristic upward slope of government yields is
well known and has been widely commented on; the results presented
here quantify this general impression and extend it to municipal
securities.
How much of the upward slope reflects transaction costs or ex-
pected trends, and how much liquidity premiums? Brokerage costs for
the purchase and sale of Treasury bills (the spread between dealer bid
and ask prices) vary, but the range seldom exceeds 4 to 20 cents per
$1,000 security on maturities of three months or less, while the
comparable cost for long-term U.S. bonds is about The impli-
cation for the yield differential depends upon the holding period be-
tween purchase and sale. (A new issue acquired from the Treasury and
held to maturity involves no brokerage costs.) In purchasing a bond
from brokers and selling back after three months, the brokerage cost is
For U.S. securities, market yields on one-week bills (kindly supplied by Jacob
Michaelsen from data he obtained from the first Boston Corporation for his "The Term
Structure of Interest Rates and Holding-Period Yields on Government Securities,"
Journal of Finance, Sept. 1965, pp. 444—463), three- and nine- to twelve-month bills
and three- to five-year bonds (Federal Reserve Bulletin), twenty-year bonds (Morgan
Guarantee Company). For municipal securities, new issues (Salomon Brothers and
Hutzler, An Analytical Record of Representative Municipal Yield Scales by Quality and
Maturity 1950—June 1965, n.d.).
Possibly because, in addition to relative differences in marketability, the risk of de-
fault increases more with maturity on the lower than on the higher grade bonds. See R. E.
Johnson, "Term Structures of Corporate Bond Yields as a Function of Risk of Default,"
Journal of Finance, May 1967, pp. 3 13—345.
Reuben Kessel, "Market Segmentation in the Treasury Bill Market," May 9, 1967,
dittoed; and Allan H. Meltzer and Gert von der Linde, A Study.of the Dealer Market for
Federal Government Securities, Joint Economic Committee, 1960, pp. 111—112.Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 111
100 basis points (that is, 1 per cent per annum), a sizable amount when
compared with the zero cost for bills held for a full term. Between
three-month bills and twenty-year U.S. bonds, the premium (Chart 4-1)
was 69 points in 1954—58 and 113 points in 1958—6 1. We cannot take
the 100-point figure, however, as the relevant difference in transaction
costs. Bonds are typically held much longer than three months, and the
difference in transaction costs between bonds of any two maturities is
small. If transaction costs accounted for the upward slopes, the dif-
ferential between one- and thirty-year municipal yields should be quite
small; in fact, it exceeds the differential between bills and twenty-year
U.S. bonds. Transaction costs appear far from sufficient, therefore, to
account for the actual slope of these yield curves, even though we can-
•not assign an exact figure to such costs without knowing the average
length of holding periods.
What about trend? Three-month bill rates rose 128 basis points from
their average monthly level during the 1949—54 cycle to that during the
1958—61 cycle, or (dividing by the interval between the reference
peaks taken as the cycle midpoints) rose 17.1 basis points per year.
Suppose that investors had anticipated the actual trend and assumed it
would continue for several decades. The market would have required
that the yield curve rise by 8.5 points per year of term to maturity,6 and
so could have accounted for more than the entire upward slope in
6Along rate can be expressed as a geometric average of the current short rate and the
expected (forward) short rates for each subsequent period to maturity (ignoring coupon
payments and liquidity premiums). If these expected short rates rise by a trend factor,
(1 + =(1+ R1)(1 + r2 + T)(1 + r3 + 2T)(1 + r4 + 3T) ..(1+ r,, + [ii—
whereand R1 are the current yields to maturity on maturities of n and I periods, r1
the I period rate in the ith period ahead expected now exclusive of trend, and T the ex-
pected increase in rates per period.
An arithmetic approximation, ignoring the compounding of interest, gives
R1 1)T
2 I
Ifinvestors expect no changes, aside from trend, all r1 equal R1, and the expression re-
duces to
T
The term structure then rises (approximately) linearly with a slope of T/2. From ten- to
twenty-year bonds, it would rise —17.1=85.5basis points. (Incorporating the
higher-order terms ignored in the approximation produces a curve in which the slope is
not constant but increases with maturity.)112 Essays on Interest Rates
Chart 4-1 beyond a certain point. On the 1958—6 1 yield curves, a slope
of 8.5 points per year occurs at a maturity of only about three years for
U.S. securities and only about seven years for municipals.
Judging by the long end of the curve, the actual trend was con-
siderably underestimated. If investors expected a trend to continue for
two decades, we can measure the expected trend by the average dif-
ferential between ten- and twenty-year prime municipals, assuming a
negligible liquidity premium between them. The figure is about 25
basis points per decade. Adjusting the short maturities for that esti-
mate of expected trend still leaves a steep slope at the very short end
of the curve. (The slope, as noted, tapers off more rapidly for U.S.
securities than it does for municipals.) Whatever adjustments for ex-
pected trend should be made, it cannot explain a yield curve with a
tapering slope, unless investors expect the upward movement to
taper off.7
The sharp rise at the lower end of the yield curves is more plausibly
explained by liquidity premiums. Such premiums are consistent with
the traditional theory of liquidity preference, which posits a wide-
spread demand in the economy for the stable market value of liquid
assets. For example, federal and municipal bonds, as they age to
within several years of maturity, become especially attractive to com-
mercial banks and other financial intermediaries as secondary reserves,
and short-term Treasury bills and certificates appeal to corporate
treasurers as investment outlets for funds needed on short notice. To
be sure, some institutions with long-term obligations, such as life
insurance companies and pension funds, desire a predictable income
more than stable capital value. A desire to hedge against the risk of
changes in interest rates by matching the maturity of acquired assets
with the maturity of given liabilities makes long-term securities the
preferred investment for these institutions. The evidence of yield
curves, however, implies that the demand for liquidity is large rela-
tive to the total market supply of short-term securities.
The demand for liquid assets relative to total financial assets is
not infinitely elastic;it declines with respect to the price paid for
liquidity, that is, the lower pecuniary yield on liquid assets. Given
trend expected to terminate in a certain number of years could produce such a
curve, but the same expectation would produce a flatter curve in the next cycle, not a
steeper one as we observe, unless the expected terminal date of the trend was pro-
gressively moved forward in time. By such ad hoc assumptions, of course, any yield
curve can be "explained."Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 113
a downward sloping demand curve, the price paid for liquidity declines
with increases in the supply of such assets. If borrowers of funds were
indifferent to the maturity of the securities they issued, liquidity pre-
miums could not exist. Short-term securities would then be issued to
take advantage of the lower yield until they saturated the market's
preference for short securities and eliminated the differential yield
relative to long debt. The existence of liquidity premiums therefore
implies that the supply is not infinitely elastic at the same yield as
prevails on long-term bonds. Most borrowers prefer to issue long-term
debt; this is certainly true of state and municipal governments and
most business corporations. Their desire to hedge leads to long-term
financing of long-lived physical assets. The federal government also
limits the issue of short securities according to the goals of debt
management. One implication of a less than infinitely elastic demand
for liquidity and supply of short liquid assets is that an exogenous shift
in the supply curve of one class of short securities affects the liquidity
premiums on all. As a case in point, commercial banks have in recent
years taken advantage of increases allowed in the deposit rate ceiling
to issue marketable certificates of deposit in large volume. These are
good substitutes for Treasury bills and add to the total supply of liq-
uid assets. It is plausible that their expanded issue during the early
1960's made the yield curve flatter than it would otherwise have been.8
Accepting the evidence of Chart 4-1 that liquidity premiums exist,
we may ask whether the premiums vary over time and if so why, the
two questions examined in the following sections.
Fluctuations in Liquidity Premiums
EVIDENCE OF FLUCTUATIONS. Chart 4-2 shows reference cycle pat-
terns of the differential yield between long- and short-term U.S.
securities. This series has no adjustment for expectations, which must
therefore be taken into account. Cyclical fluctuations in the differential
display an inverse conformity to business activity, though often during
contractions there was no increase, only a slackening in the rate of
decline. The trough generally came at stage V, though sometimes, as
8F.Modigliani and R. Sutch ("Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," American
Economic Review, May 1966, pp. 195—196) argue that CDs enhance the ability of
commercial banks to arbitrage the yield differential between long and short rates,
a similar point to that made here.114 Essays on interest Rates
CHART 4-2. Reference Cycle Patterns of Yield Differential Between U.S.
Bonds and Certificates or Bills, 192 1—67
Percent per annum Per cent per annum Per cent per annum
2
III IllIV V VIVIIVIII lx III Illlv V ViViiVIII IX
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bulletin. Long-term U.S. bond series; and three- to six-
month Treasury certificates through 1930, spliced to three-month bills thereafter.
in the 1958—61 cycle, at stage IV. The pattern for 1961—67 shows a
large decline in the differential during that period (these stages were
computed on the basis of a hypothetical business peak in December
1967). The individual bond and bill rates composing the differential
have positive conformity to business cycles and similar timing, but
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conformity of the differential. The inverse conformity may be attrib-
uted, at least in part, to anticipations of cyclical fluctuations in the
level of rates. During the later stages of business expansion, interest
rates rise to heights which investors feel cannot last; hence long rates
do not rise as sharply as do short rates in the expansion phase, and the
differential gradually declines. During business contractions when
rates fall, investors form the opposite expectation which causes the
differential to rise. If investors anticipated cyclical turning points in
rates perfectly, the differential would turn ahead of business, contrary
to its actual timing. But the absence of leading turns in the differential
yield does not mean that it is not affected by expectations. They may
not be so precise. Vague expectations of cyclical movements, with a
belief that turning points will occur but no clear idea of when, could
produce the observed inverse pattern.
If we could adjust for expectations, therefore, the resulting differ-
ential might have any pattern. The behavior of the adjusted pattern
is important, because the two leading explanations of the premium
have opposite implications about the cyclical pattern. The next sub-
section discusses these explanations, after which additional evidence
is examined.
TWO THEORIES OF FLUCTUATIONS IN LIQUIDITY PREMIUMS. The pref-
erence of most investors for short securities, giving rise to liquidity
premiums, can be attributed to the relatively stable market prices of
such securities. There is little disagreement that the existence of li-
quidity premiums reflects an aversion to the risks of capital losses
due to changes in interest rates. The question of how the premiums
fluctuate over time, however, is not settled. One theory views short
securities as partial substitutes for money balances, performing to a
degree the same functions, at least in large portfolios. These securi-
ties provide a nonpecuniary return, representing the value of the serv-
ices they perform as substitutes for money holdings. On the margin
this nonpecuniary return equals the liquidity premium. Another theory
is that investors believe that interest rates tend to return to "normal"
levels. Given an aversion to the risk of capital losses on long-term
securities, these securities will carry a yield premium depending upon
the relation of current yields to what is considered normal. This theory
can be distinguished from the standard expectations hypothesis that
expected holding-period yields are equal for all maturities.
These two theories of liquidity premiums, developed further below,116 Essays on Interest Rates
are the leading interpretations in the literature.9 While not incompat-
ible with each other, they give opposite implications for the behavior
of liquidity premiums, which allows us to test them against the data.
Short Securities As Substitutes for Money. Investors are presumed
to equate the marginal returns from the various financial assets in
their portfolios. If short securities are closer substitutes for money
than are long securities —whichseems plausible though there is little
direct evidence on the question—the slope of the yield curve is af-
fected by a change in its average level. Suppose the entire yield curve
rises because of a shift in the demand or supply of loanable funds. The
foregone interest income in holding money is higher, and the public at-
tempts to exchange part of its money balances for securities. For a
time this prevents yields from rising as much as they otherwise would.
Moreover, because investors prefer short to long securities as substi-
tutes for money, they favor shorts in the exchange, which prevents the
yield on shorts from rising as much as that on longs. Hence the pre-
mium on longs over shorts increases (aside from any effects of expecta-
tions) as a result of a rise in the entire yield curve, and the converse
is true for a decline.
On the margin investors will adjust their portfolios so that the mar-
ginal services of liquidity just compensate for differences in pecuniary
yields. The pecuniary yield differential, apart from differences due to
expected changes in interest rates, therefore measures the nonpedu-
niary services of the lower yielding security. This equality allows us to
relate yield differentials to the marginal differences in liquidity. Sup-
pose a security of term n, because of its services as a liquid asset,
allows a person to reduce his average money holdings by We
may then define= whereis the purchase price of the
security.Si,, measures the fractional amount by which the security
substitutes for money. No longer wanting to hold as much money as
before, investors can purchase nonliquid bonds or nonfinancial assets.
If rfrf is the nonpecuniary return to money balances, the total return
On the money-substitute theory, see Kessel, CyclicalBehavior, p.25, and Cagan,
"A Partial Reconciliation Between Two Views of Debt Management," Journal of Politi-
calEconomy, December1966, pp. 624—628. On risk aversion and normal rates, see F.
de Leeuw, "A Model of Financial Behavior" in Duesenberry et al., BrookingsQuarterly
EconometricModel of the United States Economy, Chicago, 1965, Chap. 13; J. Van
Home, "Interest-Rate Risk and the Term Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of
Political Economy, August 1965, 344—351; Modigliani and Sutch, ibid.; and B. 0.
Malkiel, The Term Structure of interest Rates, Princeton, N.J., 1966, pp. 59—65. On
normality in expectations, see S. Diller, "Extrapolations, Anticipations and the Term
Structure of Interest Rates," forthcoming NBER study.Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 117
on the security of term n is
R71 +SflrM, (1)
whereR,, is the pecuniary return on the security and SflrM the non-
pecuniary return from its services as a money substitute. If, on the
margin, an investor finds two securities the same except for differ-
ences in maturity (abstracting from expected changes in rates), the
total returns will be equal. For example, indifference between thirteen-
week bills and twenty-year bond implies
+ SI3WrM = + S2OYrM. (2)
This is an equilibrium condition attained through appropriate changes
in market yields.
If money holdings are in equilibrium with respect to long-term bonds,
we have, for example, rM = + S2OYrM.'°Thereappears to be little
error in assuming that is a relatively small fraction of unity;
hence rm Then the measured liquidity premium, based on
(2), is
— = (3)
If which represents the marginal substitutability of thirteen-
week bills for money, is constant, the differential yield between the
long and short securities (abstracting from expected changes in rates)
varies directly with the level of long-term rates.1'
The values of S may not, of course, remain constant. Aside from
shifts in preferences for liquidity, we may expect relative supplies to
alter to some extent the marginal services of liquidity. When the rela-
tive supply of short securities increases, their marginal substitutabil-
ity for money diminishes, signified by a decline in the values of S. An
treats any pecuniary return to money holdings as negligible.
11 At the short end of the yield curve, indifference between one- and thirteen-week
securities implies
+ S13.WrM +
The measured liquidity premium is
—=rM(SIW—
Setting= and using = — from (3), we have
—= — —
Similarly, the liquidity premium between any two securities depends upon the level of
the rates (here represented by the longer of the two) and their relative liquidity.118 Essays on Interest Rates
increased supply of any one substitute for money reduces the marginal
substitutability for money of all of them, but not by the same propor-
tion; a change in supply of one substitute affects its own marginal li-
quidity the most. Hence an increased supply of thirteen-week bills
would reduce its liquidity premium relative to other securities. This
will be manifested in a reduced yield differential relative to longer-
term securities and an increased differential relative to shorter-term
securities. The effect is to tilt the entire yield curve of U.S. securities
toward the horizontal, and at the same time to produce a peak at the
thirteen-week maturity. The change is analogous to pulling a loose
string lying on top of the previously existing yield curve and fastened
to it at the longest maturity, as in Figure 4-1. An increase in the rela-
tive supply of a given maturity swings and bends the curve, equivalent
to pulling the string upward at that point. (This analogy ignores the
possibility that an increase in supply of securities relative to the money
stock may temporarily raise the yield on even the longest maturity,
if it too is a partial substitute for money.) Given an upward sloping
curve to begin with, the transformation makes the slope more hori-
zontal and slightly peaked at the point of pull. For a decrease in supply,
the effect is just the reverse. In the following weeks, the new supply
approaches maturity, of course; if no further changes in the relative
supplies occur, the point of pull on the string would slide down the
curve toward a zero maturity and then disappear.
Different implications follow from the often stated view that the mar-
ket demand for securities is divided into separate compartments. If the
demands for different maturities are independent, an increased supply
of thirteen-week bills would raise their yield relative to both longer
and shorter securities equally, producing a hump just in that section of
the curve. The effect of supply on liquidity premiums presented above,
however, assumes that liquidity is a property shared by all maturities in
varying degree. Consequently, a change in relative supply affects dif-
ferential yields all along the curve; the slope of the entire curve changes.
The "Normal" Level of Interest Rates and Risk of Capital Loss. A
belief that interest rates sooner or later gravitate toward a "normal"
level provides an explanation of the fluctuations in liquidity premiums
which contains different implications. (Some of the studies cited in
footnote 9 claim to find evidence of such an attitude by investors in the
behavior of interest rates.) Given a preference for short over long
securities to avoid unanticipated capital losses, the belief in a return
to normal levels can produce variations in liquidity premiums. Like the
first theory, this effect relies on a preference for the stability of capitalYield
0
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a Originalcurve is drawn as a straight line for graphic simplicity only.
FIGURE 4-1. Hypothetical Effect on Yield Curve of Change in Relative
Supply of Thirteen-Week Securities
value, but it disregards any difference between long and short securities
as substitutes for money while at the same time implying variations in
premiums opposite to the first theory. The second theory is implicit in
much recent literature and may be formulated as follows.
Investors' expectations of the short-term rate can be viewed as a
probability distribution of the possible rates, as illustrated in Figure
4-2. The illustration is shown there as symmetrical, but it need not be.
The unweighted mean of the distribution is "the" expected short rate
for a future date. Current yields on longer-term securities reflect the
short rates expected in coming periods, if there is no liquidity premium,
13 weeks120 Essays on Interest Rates
Probability
FIGURE4-2. Investors' Probability Distribution of the Expected Short Rate
securityprices will be adjusted to make the expected yields over any
given period, composed of coupon payments and expected changes in
price, equal on comparable securities of varying maturities. If the mean
expected short rate for a later date turns out to be correct, the actual
return on longer securities over the period will be as expected; the
coupon payments plus price changes will provide the same return
(aside from any liquidity premium) on all maturities. If the short rate
turns out to be higher than the mean of the distribution, the yield to
maturity on longer-term securities will then also be higher than ex-
pected, produced by an unanticipated decline in their market prices and
resulting in a capital loss over the period. Conversely, if the short rate
turns out to be lower than the mean, holders of longer-term securities
will receive an unanticipated capital gain over the period.
A preference for stability of principal implies an asymmetrical view
of price changes: A potential capital gain does not offset an equal poten-
tial loss. We can imagine that investors attach weights to the probabili-
ties according to the importance of avoiding particular outcomes. Rates
higher than the mean value will receive progressively greater weight,
in reflection of their undesirability, since it is the higher than expected
rates which produce unanticipated capital losses. The weighting pat-
tern attaches a lower importance to potential rates below the mean ex-
pected value. The weighted mean value of the distribution will thus be
pulled to the right, leading to a demand for higher yields on longer-term
securities to partially compensate for the risk of capital loss. The
YieldLiquidity Premiums on Government Securities 121
amount of compensation will depend upon the probability of various
rates and the capital loss each rate would produce for a security of
given maturity, as well as the weighting pattern which quantifies the
aversion to risk. (The relative supply of short securities would also be
relevant, because the willingness to accept lower yields on short
securities to avoid the risk of capital loss will diminish as the average
maturity of an investor's total portfolio declines.) Since the amplitude
of fluctuation in security prices is known to increase with term to ma-
turity,12 the risk of capital losses increases correspondingly. Insistence
by investors on receiving compensation for such risk can account for
liquidity premiums on long relative to short securities. Such a premium,
increasing with term to maturity, modifies the "pure" expectations hy-
pothesis (that investors adjust security prices to make expected returns
equal regardless of maturity).
This explanation of liquidity premiums, though it says nothing about
short securities as substitutes for money, shares with the first theory
an assumption of risk aversion. But the two theories may have dif-
ferent implications about fluctuations in the premiums. If the shape of
the probability distribution (as well as the weighting pattern) does not
change over time, the compensation demanded by investors for incur-
ring risk will remain the same. Premiums will be constant over time. If,
on the other hand, the shape of the distribution varies systematically
over business cycles, cyclical fluctuations in liquidity premiums will
occur. One kind of variation, based on expectations of a return to nor-
mal levels, implies a certain skewness of the distribution.
Suppose that, as is often contended, investors have in mind a "nor-
mal" level of interest rates toward which they expect actual rates to
gravitate in the long run; that level would indicate the likely direction
of any large change in rates. The probability distribution of expected
rates would then be skewed toward the normal level. When the mean
expected rate is well above normal, investors would not rule out a large
decline in the rate toward or beyond the normal level. The probability
distribution is then skewed to the left, as in the top panel of Figure 4-3.
Conversely, when the mean expectation is below normal, the distribu-
tion is skewed to the right, as in the bottom panel. The shaded areas of
the distributions represent short rates above the mean expectation. If
any one of those short rates turned out to be the actual future rate, un-
anticipated capital losses occur on longer-term securities. Actual rates
below the mean produce unanticipated gains. If investors weight the
probabilities to reflect an aversion to risk of capital losses, the weighted
12Thisis not a mathematical necessity but has generally been true.122 Essays on Interest Rates
mean expectation would, as noted above, lie to the right of the un-
weighted mean, giving rise to a liquidity premium (larger for securities
of longer term) to partially compensate for the risk of capital loss. As
the expected level of short-term rates fluctuates, therefore, liquidity
premiums move inversely, being larger for a given, maturity when ex-
pected rates are low relative to the normal level than when they are
relatively high.'3
It seems reasonable to suppose that the level of rates at any time
considered to be normal reflects past experience, can be approximated
by an average of past rates, and does not change greatly over the dura-
tion of a business cycle. In contrast, the rates expected for periods
immediately ahead will ordinarily not differ greatly from current actual
rates because itis difficult to foresee sizable short-run changes in
rates. Consequently, the difference between the expected short rate
and the normal level will vary similarly to actual short rates, and to
actual long rates too, since cyclical fluctuations in long and short
rates are highly correlated. For practical purposes, therefore, the
foregoing theory implies an inverse dependence of liquidity premi-
ums on the level of interest rates, the opposite of the relation implied
by the money-substitute theory discussed previously.
Similarities and Differences Between the Two Theories. Let us
summarize the two theories in terms of an investor's behavior. When
interest rates are low, we might imagine him to demand relatively large
money balances because the cost of holding money is low, in terms of
the foregone interest earnings on financial assets. According to the
first theory, the marginal value attached to the liquidity provided by
short-term assets is then also low, and for that reason he is willing to
purchase short securities only if their yield is not too far below the
return on long securities. Liquidity premiums are then comparatively
small.
18Arecent study finds that expectations of near-term rates are skewed in the direction
of recent changes in rates —thatis, investors expect that äiiy unusually large changes in
rates are more likely to reinforce recent changes than to reverse them (see Edward J.
Kane and Burton G. Malkiel, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates: An Analysis of a
Survey of Interest-Rate Expectations," Review of Economics and Statistics, August
1967, pp. 343—355, esp. p. 349).
With risk aversion, such skewness of near-term expectations would be positively cor-
related with current or recent changes in rates. This relationship was not tested in the
subsequent statistical analysis. As explained below, our estimates of the liquidity
premium are negatively correlated with changes in rates chiefly because of errors in ex-
pectations. There is no way to test for a positive effect of changes in the rates while, at
the same time, holding the errors in expectations constant.Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 123








FIGURE4-3. Investors' Probability Distribution of the Expected Short Rate
in Relation to the Expected "Normal" Level
At the same time, his expectations may alert him to an impending
rise in short-term rates toward normal levels, and he will acquire long-
term securities only if they carry a higher current yield in reflection of
a later rise in short rates. (Such expectational effects, though they do
not produce a premium, are compatible with any theory of liquidity
premiums.) Furthermore, according to the second theory he wants to
avoid the risk of capital losses even at the expense of giving up what
he considers an equal chance of capital gains. Due to the lingering
recollection of the normal level of rates, he regards the currently low
short rate as temporary, and his probability distribution of expected
rates is skewed toward a return to the higher, normal level. Thus he
regards an extra large capital loss on long securities as more probable124 Essays on Interest Rates
than an extra large gain even though the expected dollar values of
gains and losses are equal, and he avoids long securities unless they
carry an extra premium yield. Liquidity premiums are then compara-
tively large. When interest rates are high, these considerations apply
in reverse.
Both theories therefore help to explain the existence of liquidity
premiums, but the fluctuations they imply in the premiums are oppo-
site in direction—the first positively associated with the level of rates,
the second associated inversely. They might both be valid descriptions
of behavior for different groups of investors, or even perhaps as two in-
fluences on the same investors. Whether the fluctuations they produce
in liquidity premiums cancel each other out or one of the two generally
prevails can only be determined empirically.
Either of the two theories can explain the "humped" yield curve
often observed in periods of tight credit. At such times the curve
slopes upward at the lower end and downward at the longer end, form-
ing a hump usually in the range of the two- to five-year maturities.
When explained by expectations alone, such a curve implies that in-
vestors anticipate a rise in short-term rates for the next year or two,
and thereafter a decline. Yet the short rates of such periods seldom
remain high more than a few months, and it seems unlikely that inves-
tors would consistently misjudge actual developments. A more appeal-
ing explanation of the hump, as Kessel has emphasized,14 is to combine
liquidity premiums and expectations that rates will decline shortly.
The premiums contribute to an upward slope in the yield curve, and the
expectations to a downward slope. If the slope due to liquidity pre-
miums tapers off sharply for maturities beyond a year or two, a combi-
nation of the two effects can produce the observed humped curve.
The occurrence of these curves in times of tight credit indicates
that liquidity premiums impart a strong upward slope to the yield
curve especially when the level of rates is high. This seems to suggest
that the premiums vary directly with the level of rates, but such evi-
dence is not inconsistent with an inverse variation, so long as the level
of rates at such times is not so high that the risk of capital loss becomes
negligible and the premium, due to that risk, falls to zero.
The inverse conformity to business cycles of the U.S. bond-bill
rate differential (Chart 4-2) seems to support the second theory of
liquidity premiums. The differential is lowest near business peaks
when the level of rates tends to be highest, as that theory predicts.
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But that evidence is relevant only if expectations play a negligible part
in the fluctuations, which seems most unlikely. Near business peaks,
investors who are alert to business prospects will expect rates to de-
cline sooner or later, and they will push long rates down close to cur-
rent short rates. (That effect does not require any skewness in the prob-
ability distribution of expected rates or an aversion to capital losses.)
Consequently, whether liquidity premiums vary directly or inversely
with the level of rates, or change at all, is not implied by such cyclical
movements in the long-short differential. Those movements can be
said to suggest that investors expect unusually high or low short-term
rates to return to normal levels.'5 But if we also want to distinguish
between the two theories of liquidity premiums, it is necessary to iso-
late the effect of expectations.
Tests of the Two Theories
In his study, Kessel concluded that liquidity premiums fluctuate posi-
tively with the level of interest rates, based on data for the short end
of the yield curve in the post-World War II period. He found that the
premium on eight-week bill rates relative to four-week rates, adjusted
for expectations,16 had a positive correlation with the level of four-
week rates from October 1949 to February 1961, and that the adjusted
premium on six-month rates relative to three-month rates also exhib-
ited a positive correlation with the level of three-month rates from
January 1959 to February 1961.
To estimate liquidity premiums, Kessel compared the yields on two
securities of different maturity for the same periods. This eliminates
the effects of expectations, because as noted the market adjusts prices
so that expected holding-period yields (aside from liquidity and risk
premiums) on different securities will be the same. The yield differ-
ential then reflects influences other than anticipated changes in rates.
The yield period he selected for comparison was the period to matur-
ity of the longer security. With maturities of three months and one year,
for example, the yield to maturity on the one-year security is compared
with the total return from investing in the three-month security, then
is the explanation for those movements given by B. G. Malkiel, The Term
Structure,Chap.4. He does not distinguish between such expectations and fluctuations
in the liquidity premium.
CyclicalBehavior, p. 26. Kessel measured the premium by the difference between
the forward rate and the corresponding future spot rate, which allows for expectations.126 Essays on Interest Rates
upon its maturity reinvesting the proceeds three more times in succes-
sive three-month issues, thus keeping the funds invested for a full year.
Such comparisons are only feasible, however, for fairly short maturi-
ties. (Kessel used this procedure in the results just cited for maturi-
ties of eight weeks and six months.) For bonds, the procedure intro-
duces statistical. difficulties. It would involve, for example, comparing
the yields on five-year bonds and three-month bills over a holding pe-
riod of five years; that is, each observation of their differential yield
would pertain to a five-year period. Whether or not overlapping periods
are used, such long intervals render time-series analysis quite imprac-
tical, as well as involve large errors in investors' expectations be-
cause of the long lead time.
An alternative procedure, used here, is to calculate yields on all
securities for the same holding period of some short duration, re-
gardless of their individual maturities, which eliminates the necessity
of comparisons for widely separate dates. The holding-period yields of
long-term securitiesstill involve large errors in expectations —the
problem cannot be avoided. But these errors can be taken into account
to some extent, so that estimates of premiums at the long end of the
yield curve adjusted for expectations appear feasible for time-series
analysis.
ESTIMATING LIQUIDITY PREMIUMS BY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOLD-
ING-PERIOD YIELDS. Holding-period yields measure the rate of return
on a security purchased at the beginning of a given period and sold at
the end, which ordinarily will not coincide with the term to maturity.
The data presented below are one-week holding-period yields on
Treasury securities.17 No special appropriateness can be claimed for
the one-week period. Other periods, while worth experimenting with,
would probably give similar results.
The one-week holding-period yield on a security of maturity n at
Ideally we want to use the holding period for which the error variance of expecta-
tions is lowest, which seems most likely to be the actual period over which investors
plan to hold. Some speculation in bills may occur on a daily or weekly basis, while bond
investors may purchase to hold for months, quarters, or years. Actual holding periods
for which investors form expectations and make comparisons among securities probably
differ widely among investors and over time. Data on average holding periods are not
available, moreover, which makes the one-week period somewhat arbitrary. Yet if ex-
pectations equalize yields for periods of one week or less, the equality will carry over to
longer periods as well. Errors of forecast may or may not be larger for longer periods; it
depends upon whether public anticipations are more accurate for short- or long-run
changes in rates.Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 127





where is the price of a security at the beginning of week t with n
weeks to maturity (disregarding buying and selling costs); and is
the coupon payment, if any, on that security at the end of the week.'8
The expectations theory, altered to allow for liquidity premiums, as-
sumes that
= —+ (5)
whereis the expected total yield during week t, the same for all
maturities; is the known nonpecuniary yield during week t due to
liquidity services from a security with n weeks to maturity (E —Lis
the expected pecuniary yield); and is the error of expected
pecuniary yield for this security in week t. All yields are expressed as
annual rates. For any two maturities n and m, n > m:
—Hm,t= —+ — (6)
where the error terms are assumed to have zero means. Hence, as an
approximation, for sufficiently large T,'9
Hm,t)=Lm —>0. (7)
This is the measure of liquidity premiums used here. T is thirteen
weeks.
The error termcan be quite large at times. Although the difference
between the errors, — will be much smaller than either one
separately owing to positive correlation, the difference may still be
large at times, because unanticipated changes in rates usually have a
18 formulafollows from the properties of exponential growth. Ifthe growth
in a price from 0 to T, equals r is the constant exponential rate of growth. Hence
19Sincen and ,n do not change over time in (7), the average value of for a period
of n weeks is not the same as the yiekl on holding the same security to maturity.
Eq. (7) is based on selling each week a n —Iweek bill and replacing it with an n week
bill. See the Appendix to this chapter for further discussion of measuring liquidity pre-
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greater affect on the prices of securities with longer maturities. The
possibility of large errors means that fluctuations in measured liquidity
premiums must be interpreted with some caution.
Chart 4-3 presents one-week holding period yields of one- to thir-
teen-week Treasury bills for various reference stages and their average
for two full cycles,20 showing in detail the steepest part of the yield
curve—the short end. These curves are not smooth, no doubt mainly as
a result of unanticipated changes in actual yields, but generally they
rise up to the seven- to eight-week maturities. The data are averages
of bid and ask prices and so do not allow for transaction costs in the
form of dealer spreads. The spread is usually the smallest on newly
issued thirteen-week bills and nearby maturities than on others, which
may help explain why the curve levels off from the seven- to thirteen-
week maturities. In any event, over-all upward slope of these
curves can be interpreted as evidence of liquidity premiums, since in-
vestors presumably adjust prices so that expected holding-period
yields (apart from premiums) are equal on all maturities.
There is also evidence of cyclical fluctuations in the premiums; the
peak stages (V) appear to have steeper slopes than do the trough stages
(I and IX). This is brought out more clearly by Chart 4-4, which
presents the quarterly differences between the thirteen- and one-week
yields for the period 1951—65 (top panel), and some other related series
discussed later. Reference contractions are shaded. (Differences be-
tween twelve- and two-week yields, not presented, exhibit similar
movements.) The thirteen- and one-week yield differential fluctuated
during this period generally in the same direction as business activity,
though not consistently from quarter to quarter. The high point came
considerably after the 1957 reference peak, for example, and the
decline following the 1960 peak was slower and more prolonged than
any previous one.
Much of the fluctuation in the differential appears to reflect errors
in expectations, and to be negatively correlated with changes in the
three-month bill rate (second panel). This suggests that the error terms
in (6) are inversely associated with changes in interest rates, because
20Mostof these data were kindly supplied to me by Jacob Michaelsen from his study.
His compilation, from The First Boston Corporation, begins with 1951, ends with 1962,
and is for Friday closing prices. The data were extended by the National Bureau back
to 1948 and forward to 1965 and are for Tuesday prices from the quotation sheets
kindly made available by the New York government securities department of Merrill
Lynch. The difference in the day of the week should not make any-difference for present
purposes. The basic data are averages of bid and ask prices, except for the maturity
vaiue of one-week bills which was taken to be par.Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 129
CHART 4-3. Yield Curve of Treasury Bills, One-Week Holding-Period,
Reference Stages and Cycle Averages
1954-58 1958-61
centper annum)
SOURCE: See footnote 20.
1 1
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CHART 4-4. Estimated Liquidity Premium on Treasury Bills, Change, Level,
and Deviation of Three-Month Rate, and Relative Supply, Quarterly, 195 1—65
Percent
changes in the level of rates, if not fully anticipated, produce greater
capital gains and losses on long than on short maturities. This causes
the difference between the error terms to duplicate their individual
movements. Why should errors in expectations be negatively cor-
related with changes in rates? An obvious answer is "inertia" of ex-
pectations —atendency of some investors to expect future rates to be
the same as current ones. As a simple formulation of this interpreta-
tion, let us suppose that some constant fraction a of the market de-
mand for securities is based on the expectation of no change in rates
and the remainder is based on an expectation having a prediction error
1951'52'53'54'55'56'57'58'59'60'61
NOTE;Shaded areas represent reference cycle contractions.
SOURCE: See Table 4-1; data not seasonally adjusted.Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 131
withzero mean.2' Then, assuming the Ls involve no error, the error
terms in (6) are
—= (Hm,t —Hrn,t_i)]+ (1 —
a) (8)
The first term on the right is simply the difference between the changes
in holding-period yields for the two maturities, which for n > m is a
negative function of the change in level of interest rates. The exact
relationship depends upon the maturity of the securities, but we can
treat it as approximately proportional to the negative of the change in
the three-month bill rate. The second term is the prediction error, as-
sumed independent of the level of rates. We may substitute (8) into
(6) with a view to improving the estimate of liquidity premiums. The
change in the bill rate will account for part of the errors in expectations
and allow a better estimate of the effects of other variables on liquidity
premiums.22 If a is not constant, the estimates may be biased, though
21Amore sophisticated hypothesis would be that expectations are formed from an
autoregressive scheme of past rates plus an autonomous component with a mean error
of zero.
22InThe Behavior of Interest Rates: A Progress Report, NBER, New York, 1966,
Appendix to Chapter 7, Joseph Conard questioned Kessel's empirical findings on the
grounds that the liquidity premium is spuriously correlated with changes in the level of
rates. Kessel's measure of the premium is the difference between the forward rate and
the relevant future actual rate. Conard's point is that the forward rate, because of
"inertia" Sin the formation of expectations, generally differs very little from the current
actual rate; consequently, this measure of the liquidity premium approximates the cur-
rent minus the future actual rate, which is the negative of the change in the rate. Then, if
there is a tendency for the change in the rate over any period to be negatively correlated
with the level of the rate at the beginning of the period, as is not unlikely because of
cyclical fluctuations and as Conard presented evidence to confirm, one has identified a
source of spurious correlation between the premium and the level of the rate to account
for at least part of Kessel's results. In an unpublished work Kessel tested this interpreta-
tion by running regressions with the current spot rate in place of the forward rate in the
estimate of the liquidity premium. On Conard's interpretation, ihese regressions should
have higher correlation coefficients. Kessel finds higher coefficients using the forward
rates, supporting the validity of his interpretation of the correlations.
The difference in holding-period yields used here as a measure of the liquidity pre-
mium is also negatively correlated with changes in the rate for a related reason: Unan-
ticipated changes in the level of rates have an effect on the price of securities which in-
creases with the length of maturity, and hence affect differences in holding-period yields.
By holding the change in rates constant, we remove spurious correlation of the kind
Conard attributed to Kessel's results and absorb part of the errors of expectations as
well.132 Essays on interest Rates
perhaps not seriously. For the tentative results derived below, such
bias will be ignored.
MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS. The two theories of liquidity premiums dis-
cussed above imply certain testable relations among the variables. The
relevant variables are depicted in Chart 4-4 for comparison with the
differential holding-period yields between thirteen- and one-week bills.
The cost of holding money is represented by the three-month bill
rate—it should by the first theory relate positively to the differential.
The relative supply is represented by the average difference between
the amounts of one- and thirteen-week bills held by the public, ex-
pressed as a percentage of total bills held—it should by either theory
relate negatively to the differential. The risk of capital losses is repre-
sented by the deviation of the three-month bill rate from normal levels
estimated by a weighted average of the past nine quarters, the weights
declining linearly23 —itshould by the second theory relate negatively to
the differential. Multiple regressions of these variables, including the
change in the three-month bill rate to represent errors of expectation,
as in (8) are presented in Table 4-1.
The change in rates is highly correlated (negatively) with the differ-
ence in holding-period yields, as was evident in the chart. The level of
bill rates is also significant, and has a positive regression coefficient
consistent with the money-substitute theory. By this estimate, the
premium increases 15 basis points for each 1 percentage point rise
in the level of rates.24
The relative supply is not significant, however, and has a positive
coefficient, inconsistent with both theories. Changes in this variable —
thesupply of one-week bills minus the supply of thirteen-week bills —
shouldaffect the premium inversely, since a relative rise in the supply
of one-week bills can be expected to bring their yield closer to the
thirteen-week rate, reducing the differential. To be sure, we may not
have measured the relative supply properly. Other very short-term
10—S 23That is, normal level = as a rough approximation.
24Kessel(Cyclical Behavior, p. 26) found increases of 22 and 45 basis points in his
two regressions, which, as noted, covered shorter periods and estimated liquidity pre-
miums differently.
The regression results reflect the fact that thirteen-week yields fluctuate with greater
amplitude than do one-week yields. The money-substitute theory is an acceptable ex-
planation only if there is no inherent tendency of an institutional character for the cycli-
cal amplitude of bill yields to increase with term to maturity. In particular, any cyclical
variations in relative dealer spreads are ignored here.Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 133
TABLE 4-1. Multiple Regressions of Difference Between Holding-Period
Yields for Thirteen- and One-Week Bills on Change, Level, and Deviation
of Three-Month Rate, and Relative Supply, Quarterly, 195 1—65
Regression Coefficient (and t value) Multiple
Corre- .
Eua- Deviation oflation
tion Change in Level of Relative Rate from
Number Rate Rate Supply "Normal" dent
1 —.71 (6.8) .15 (2.9) .69
2 —.81 (6.8) .15 (2.9) .01 (1.6) .70
3 —.84 (6.8) .12 (1.8) .01 (1.5) .09 (0.9) .71
SOURCE: Holding-period yields, see footnote 20. Bill rate, Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Relative supply based on Treasury bills held by the public, Monthly Treasury Bulletin.
Data not seasonally adjusted.
NOTE: Dependent variable is as defined by eq. (4), quarterly average of
weekly yields, per cent per annum. The constant terms are not shown. Independent
variables are:
Change in rate: change over the quarter in three-month bill rate, per cent per annum.
Level of rate: three-month bill rate, quarterly average of monthly data, per cent
per annum.
Relative supply: difference between one- and thirteen-week bills held by the public,
quarterly average of weekly data, as percentage of midquarter total bills held [actually,
the numerator was estimated by the quarterly change in total bills held divided by 13,




13 — 13 — 13
whereis bills of maturity n outstanding in week t and is total bills outstanding in
week t].
Deviation from normal: three-month bill rate minus weighted average of past rates for
nine quarters, linearly declining weights (see footnote 22), per cent per annum. Quarterly
data are averages of monthly rates.
Signs of t values have been dropped. At .05 level of significance, t > 2.0.
bills are close substitutes for the one-week bills, and thirteen-week
bills are substitutable with longer-term bills. It is not clear how to treat
substitutes in measuring the relative supply. In addition, appreciable
bunching in the maturity distribution of bills is fairly infrequent, oc-
curring temporarily only when the rate of new issues is suddenly
changed; consequently, relative supplies may not have affected the
premiums between the bill yields sufficiently to register in these
regressions.134 Essays on interest Rates
The deviations of the rate from normal levels have a low and in-
significant coefficient. This variable and the level of the rate have
similar movements apart from trends.25 Each correlates positively with
the premium, even when the other is held constant, though the rate
level has the stronger association. The deviations should affect the
premium negatively, since a fall in rates below what is considered the
normal level increases the risk of capital loss and requires as com-
pensation a yield which is higher on longer than on shorter maturities.
On this evidence, changes in the premium at the short end of the yield
curve do not support the second theory.
Examining the long end of the yield curve is more relevant than the
short end to theories of liquidity premiums. The relevant series are
shown in Chart 4-5.Thetop series is the difference between holding-
period yields on two and a half-year bonds and thirteen-week bills.
Corresponding differentials using bills and five-, seven and a half-,
and ten-year bonds (not shown) have similar movements. These data,
compiled by Michaelson (see footnote 20) through 1962, were not ex-
tended. For ease of comparison the change and level of the rate and
its deviations from normal are the same series as in Chart 4-4, based
on the three-month bill rate. It would perhaps be better (see footnote
11) to compare the premium on bonds relative to bills with the level
of the bond instead of the bill rate, but any mismatching on that score
does not appear serious, since movements in bond and bill rates are
similar.
The relative supply variable is necessarily different here, however.
According to the money-substitute theory of liquidity premiums, bills
are used as a substitute for money balances, while bonds serve that
purpose only to a very limited extent. The marginal substitutability of
bills for money depends upon the supply of bills relative to money.
25 simplecorrelation between these two variables for the period covered in
Table 4-1 is +.58. Lengthening the weighted average which estimates the normal level
of the rate (footnote 23) would increase this correlation.
Multicollinearity between the change in rates and the deviations from normal may
have turned a negative coefficient for the latter into a positive one. The correlation
coefficient between the two is +.35. However, the simple correlation between the devia-
tions and the differential is virtually zero.
Multicollinearity can also result from common cyclical fluctuations. We can hold
common cyclical fluctuations in the variables constant by means of dummy variables. A
separate dummy variable can be added to represent each of the stages of reference cycles
in business activity. When that was done, the coefficient of the deviations variable be-
came negative, but again it remained low and insignificant while the significance of the
rate level was increased.Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 135
CHART 4-5. Estimated Liquidity Premium on Treasury
Bonds, Change, Level, and Deviation of Three-Month Rate,
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NOTE:Shaded areas represent reference cycle contractions.
SOURCE: See Table 4-2; data not seasonally adjusted.
The chart therefore shows the ratio of bills (and CDs 26) to the money
stock outside commercial banks. It might be preferable to use instead
the ratio pertaining to business and financial institutions, which hold
most outstanding bills, but such data were not readily available.
26Thestatistical analysis implicitly assumes that the pecuniary yield on money is
zero. With the rise of time deposit rates toward the end of the 1950's and expansion of
certificates of deposit, this assumption was no longer valid. CDs were therefore treated
as a substitute for bills, and were included in total bills outstanding and excluded from
the money stock. Nevertheless, CDs were not quantitatively important until after 1962.
The ratio of bills to bonds outstanding is also relevant to the second theory, since a136 Essays on Interest Rates
The bond-bill differential in the chart naturally shows much greater
volatility than the corresponding differential in Chart 4-4 (note that the
scale is compressed here). Unanticipated changes in rates affect hold-
ing-period yields more for longer maturities. The bond-bill differential
is subject to frequent and substantial errors of expectations, and some
allowance for these errors seems necessary to improve the estimates
of the premium. As before, we may use (the negative of) changes in the
three-month rate as an index of the direction and magnitude of the
errors.
Table 4-2 presents multiple regressions of the differential on the
other variables in Chart 4-5. The bottom three regressions use longer-
term bonds for the differential rate. The results, though generally in
the same direction as in Table 4-1, are materially weaker. Changes in
the rate are inversely related to the bond-bill differential, reflecting
unanticipated capital losses on bonds when rates rise and unanticipated
gains when rates fall. The other variables are all positively related, but
none are significant. Since the relative supply and the deviations from
normal are supposed to have negative coefficients but have positive
ones here, we may tentatively conclude that these variables do not
have the effects implied by the theory, or at least were not important
in the period covered. The main qualification is that the supply variable
may as before fail to include relevant substitutes for bills, and thus may
be misspecified.
The level of the rate has a positive effect consistent with the money-
substitute theory, and, though not significant as in Table 4-1, the coeffi-
cient has a reasonable magnitude. The coefficients for the level of the
rate in Table 4-2 provide estimates of the marginal substitutability of
bills for money balances. If we assume that ten-year bonds have
negligible liquidity, then, as in eq. (2), + = The re-





rise in the ratio helps to satisfy the preference for bills and leads to a smaller differential.
What total quantity of bonds should be used in the denominator, however, appears
arbitrary. Yet, such a ratio, however defined, might behave similarly to the ratio of bills
to money stock used here.Liquidity Premiums on Government Securities 137
TABLE 4-2. Multiple Regressions of Difference Between Holding-Period
Yields for Various Bonds and Thirteen-Week Bills on Change, Level, and




Regression Coefficient(and t value) Multiple
Corre-
lation Deviation of
Variable Change in Level of Relative Rate from Coeffi-










5 —9.6 (5.6) 1.0(0.9) .64
7.5 —12.2 (5.7) 1.3(1.0) .65
10 —11.8 (5.0) 1.2(0.9) .60
SOURCE: Same as for Table 4-1. Money stock, M. Friedman and A. Schwartz, A
Monetary History of the United States, 1867—1960, Princeton for NBER, 1963, Table
Al, extended and revised. Negotiable CDs of $100,000 or more, weekly reporting
banks, from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, August 1965, Chart 1, with
logarithmic interpolation.
NOTE: The dependent variable for the first regression is — as defined by
eq. (4), per cent per annum, and similarly for the others with longer bond maturities.
Independent variables are the same as for Table 4-1, except for relative supply, which
is total Treasury bills held by the public as a percentage of the money stock (adjusted for
CDs—see footnote 26). The constant terms are not shown.
Signs of t values have been dropped. At .05 level of significance, t > 2.0.
that is, the liquidity premium for the given supply makes the bill yield
on the average one-half the bond yield.27
The failure of the level of the rate to achieve statistical significance
in Table 4-2 may be due to the volatility of the bond-bill differential
and the failure of changes in the rate to account adequately for errors
of expectations. Whether a more reliable method of adjusting for the
errors would alter these results is not known. By all indications, the
27Theliquidity premium measured from the slope of the yield curve for 1954—5 8 in
Chart 4-1 is
1 —RI3W/RIOY =.22.
This is an alternative estimate of Aside from the periods covered, the two esti-
mates should differ only in that the method of holding expectations constant is not the
same, and the measurement from the yield curve (based on a cycle average) assumes that
the relation between the premium and the level of the rate is log linear and goes through
the origin, while the regression assumes arithmetic linearity and does not require the
constant term to be zero.138 Essays on interest Rates
money-substitute theory outperforms the theory based on normal rates
and risk aversion. The first is strongly supported by the regressions
for the short end of the yield curve. Its importance to the premium be-
tween bonds and bills, though suggested by the results here, remains
tentative.
Summary and Conclusions
The yields of U.S. and municipal securities, plotted by maturity, have
an upward slope which appears not to reflect differences in transaction
costs or expectations. The slope represents a lower pecuniary yield on
the shorter-term securities apparently due to the greater stability of
their market prices. This "liquidity" premium can be observed on U.S.
securities back, at least, to 1920 when Treasury certificates were first
traded.
Two theories were examined to explain short-run fluctuations in the
premium. The first theory views the premium as reflecting the greater
substitutability of short-term securities for money balances. When an
expansion, say, in business conditions raises the level of interest rates,
money becomes comparatively more expensive to hold, and it is ex-
changed for new securities and other assets until the marginal value of
the services from the remaining money balances rises to equal the
foregone return available on nonliquid long-term bonds or on capital
goods. In exchanging money for other assets, the more liquid short-
term securities are preferred. Short-term yields are therefore held down
relative to long-term yields; although interest rates as a whole rise,
the differential yields between short and long securities widen. Con-
versely, in a business contraction producing a decline in interest rates,
the differential narrows. This increase in slope of the yield curve when
the level rises, and decrease in slope when the level falls, occurs in-
dependently of any expectation of changes in rates.
The second theory views liquidity premiums as resulting from a
general belief that interest rates gravitate toward the "normal" level
expected to prevail over the long run and from an aversion to the risk
of capital losses on long securities. If we take an average of past yields
to reflect what appears to investors as normal at any time, we should
find a higher yield on long relative to short securities when interest
rates are relatively low, because long securities are then especially
subject to capital losses; and conversely when rates are high. This
implies an inverse relationship, opposite to the first theory. A test ofLiquidity Premiums on Government Securities 139
these theories requires data on yield differentials from which the effects
of expected changes in rates have somehow been eliminated.
Investors are presumed to bid bond prices up or down until, taking
account of expected capital gains or losses, the expected returns on all
options are equally attractive. On the average, therefore, returns from
all investments are supposed to be equal over a given period except
for errors in expectations and any liquidity premiums. If the errors
tend to cancel out, the premiums can be estimated by the difference
between the actual returns on two optional investments. The usual
method has been to compare the yield to maturity of one security with
the accumulated yield from successive reinvestments in a shorter-term
security; for example, the yield to maturity on a six-month bill com-
pared with the total return on two successive three-month bills. For
bonds with maturities of several years or more, however, the method
becomes impractical since the period covered by each comparison is
as long as the maturity of the bond. Hence an estimate of the premium
on two and a half-year bonds (say) gives one observation every two
and one-half years; if we permit overlapping comparisons, the observa-
tions are then serially dependent and unfit for time-series analysis.
To avoid such disadvantages, this study has used one-week holding-
period yields, which compare the returns on buying two securities and
selling both after one week regardless of their maturity. This provides
one observation per week (though the statistical analysis used quarterly
averages). The main drawback of this method is that unanticipated
changes in interest rates produce large discrepancies between realized
and expected holding-period yields on bonds. These errors in expecta-
tions are incorporated into the estimates of the liquidity premium and
obscure the analysis. We attempted to account for these errors by
adding changes in the market bill rate as an independent variable to
the regressions. The volatility of holding-period differentials neverthe-
less remains troublesome, and it should be profitable in future research
on liquidity premiums to explore other methods of dealing with the
errors in expectations.
Although limited and necessarily tentative, the results give no sup-
port to a theory of liquidity premiums based on normal rates and favor
instead the money-substitute theory. The deviations of interest rates
from the normal level, representing the risk of capital loss, has the
wrong sign (and is not significant) for regressions covering both the
short and long ends of the yield curve. The level of interest rates does
have a correct and significant positive correlation with the estimated
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also found for slightly longer maturities. For the premium on bonds
relative to bills, the regression coefficient of the rate level is again
positive though not significant. It is unclear whether the lack of statisti-
cal significance here indicates no relation or simply our failure to
measure it properly, perhaps because errors in expectations were not
adequately eliminated. In any event, the size of its regression coeffi-
cient appears reasonable, suggesting that during the 1950's a $1000
Treasury bill substituted on the margin for about $500 of money
balances.
Although the relative supply of money substitutes should also affect
the liquidity premium, the supply variable is insignificant in the regres-
sions. This is not, however, a conclusive test of the importance of the
supply. Most changes in the distribution of Treasury bills seem too
small to have measureable effects on premiums between the very short
maturities. And supply effects on the bond-bill premium may not be
adequately represented by changes in the ratio of Treasury bills to
the money stock, as is used here. What to include in the total supply
of substitutes cannot be settled theoretically but requires further
empirical study. Developments during the early 1960's, when the sharp
growth of certificates of deposit accompanied a decline in the bond-bill
premium, suggest that supply effects may be important.
Supply effects on liquidity premiums have acquired a practical im-
portance in recent years because of the Federal Reserve's "operation
twist"—an effort during the early 1960's to raise short-term interest
rates relative to long-term rates. The purpose was to alleviate the
adverse U.S. balance of payments by attracting capital funds from
abroad for domestic investment in short-term securities, while at the
same time to reduce domestic unemployment by keeping long-term
rates low enough to encourage investment expenditures. The twofold
policy required a reduction in the differential between short- and long-
term rates. Based on subsequent events, the policy appeared to reduce
the differential, though only somewhat more than had occurred in the
two previous business expansions (Chart 4-2).Whetherthe reduction
reflected Federal Reserve market operations at all is subject to ques-
tion. By the money-substitute theory, the policy required an increase
in the supply of bills relative to the money stock or a decline in bond
yields. But neither change appears to have been large enough to
account for the decline that occurred in the differential. That is why
one looks for alternative explanations such as the increased issue of
CDs.
While we are not yet able to measure liquidity premiums accuratelyLiquidity Premiums on Government Securities 141
or to understand fully the causes of fluctuations, recent developments
in the technique of measurement, reviewed and extended here, hold
out the promise of answering such questions by quantitative analysis.
Appendix
A COMPARISON OF TWO ESTIMATES OF LIQUIDITY PREMIUMS: HOLDING-
PERIOD YIELDS AND YIELDS TO MATURITY
A holding-period yield which happens to coincide with the period to maturity
of a security equals the yield to maturity; otherwise the two are different.
When the yields contain liquidity premiums, there are also conceptual differ-
ences in measurement of the premium. Although for most practical purposes
these differences do not appear important, they should be made explicit. A
simple example will help to clarify the two definitions of the premium.
Let us compare four- and eight-week bills, and suppose we calculate a
holding-period yield of four weeks. That yield for four-week bills is simply
their yield to maturity, R4,, (all yields expressed at an annual rate). The eight-
week bill, with maturity value can be purchased at the price P8,, =
P0,,÷8/(I+ and sold in four weeks at the price then of four-week bills:
=P0,,÷8/(1+ Hence the first four-week holding-period yield
on eight-week bills, at an annual rate,
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which by an arithmetic approximation equals
2R8,, —R4,,÷4—R4,,. (A3)
As originally defined by Hicks. in Value and Capital, liquidity premiums
attach to forward rates. An estimate of the premium is the forward rate minus
the actual future rate. For eight- and four-week rates, we have
—R4,,+4=L4,,+4—L8,,, (A4)
where 4F4,, is the forward rate at time t on a four-week security beginning in
four weeks, which covers eight weeks of time. The four-week forward rate,
at an annual rate, is
1(1_+_R8,,)81521'3
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The arithmetic approximation to (A5) is
—R4,1— (A6)
the same as for holding-period yields in (A3), though conceptually the pre-
mium estimated there is L4,1 —L8,1,not —L8,1as here. This equivalence
of formulas, of course, holds only if the term of the predicted rate equals the
length of the holding period. With a shorter holding period, there is no equiv-
alent formula using forward rates and no equivalent estimate of liquidity
premiums pertaining to the same time period.
In fact, since forward rates are defined in terms of yields to maturity, the
liquidity premiums estimated from them are an average for a series of holding
periods. Consider the premium attached to as implied by the slope of the
yield curves in Chart 4-1. Its relation to L71,1 used in eqs. (3)—(7) may be de-
rived as follows.
Express as a geometric average of successive holding-period yields
(footnote 6),
(1 + =(1+ + ...(1+








For an average yield curve, let us assume that interest rates are expected to
remain the same (that is, the Es for all periods are equal) and that L,L expected





By holding-period yields, the corresponding premium is
— = —
It seems unlikely that these differences in the measurement of liquidity
premiums have much practical importance, however.